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On the 12th of June 1993, Nigerians trooped to the polls to once again and for the third
time since the country's independence, inaugurate yet another republic through the ballot
box. In spite of mounting acrimonies, the election held and it was judged by virtually all
domestic and international observers as the freest and the fairest Nigeria has ever had. As
the results of the election began to trickle in. the military President. General Ibrahim
Babaneida. suddenly announced the susoension of the announcement of the election
results, eventuallv canceling the result outriuhl and susDcndinu the whole transition
oroeram. This abortion of the transition of oaf am threw the countrv into a oeriod of
urofbund crisis from which it is vet to recover. Usinu the 1993 election as a case sludv.
this DaDer examines the crisis of democratic transition in Nigeria. The relevance of oooular
culture, its deveiooment. ils use and abuse as well as its inmacl on ihe inlra-dite slniuttle
and comoetition for oower and for dominance are enunciated and analyzed.
The Antecedents
On 1st October I960. Nigeria attained indeuendencc from British colonialism The final
years of the decolonization Drocess were marked bv considerable acrimonious and inier-
t-rourt antipathies. These nearlv icouardized the whole decolonization Drocess and almost
forestalled the emergence of Nigeria as a single and a united cntitv. Contlict and
controversy over regional boundaries, the form of t>overnnu;nl to be adoulcd as well as
over the precise liming of independence created tension and bad blood that combined, and
continued after independence to, hamper inter-group harmony and cooperation. Many
reasons have been adduced for the failures and disappointments that succeeded the years
ofhope and expectations in post-colonial Africa. In Nigeria, the British in alliance with the
emergent elite adopted the Westminister model of parliamentary democracy for (he
country. A federalist system was adopted, in an attempt to niak? provision for regional
miluiiomy without jeopardizing national unity The federal system however failed Id work
for structural and other reasons A situation in which one rcttion(lhcNorlb) was in a
nositton. territorially and dcrnotratiliicailv. to dominate all the oiher regions ooliiicailv was
inherently inimical for the operation and survival of a federal svstcm The stiff and
desperate sirueelc for nower. the intolerance of ODnosition. the political uproars, notched
elections, man initialed census, corruotion and mismananement as well as the breakdown of
law and order onralvzecl the government and created a Dermancni state of fear and
anarcliv. Bv the lime the armv intervened in January 1966 killing, amonu others, the
Prime Minisicr and ihc Premiers of the Nonh. ihe West and the Mid-west, manv Nigerians
welcomed the new dispensation as a oreferable. albeit interim, alternative to the chaos and
instability of a perverted democracy. But the Dolitical maelstrom could not be arrested
even with the replacement of the reeions with twelve states bv the new Head of State. Lt.
Col. Yakubu Go won. The inter-elite cum inter-reeional rivalries and tension resulted in
crams and counter-conns which climaxed in the Biafran war which lasted for thtrtv
months* 1967-197m costine the nation about two million lives.
The end of the war was followed bv a massive nroeram of rehahilitatton and
reconstruction in an attemnt to erase the nhvsical scar of the war and reintegrate the
defeated erouo back into the nation. Fortunately for the country, the advent nf ncacc also
coincided with exoansion in petroleum oil exploration and exnort A ncriod of
unnrcccdcntcd and unexpected and thus unnlanned for economic hoom set in for the
country But the widiwnrcari corruption official indiscipline and the rcnouinu on the
nromisc of the mitiiarv to hand over to a democratically elected Government hv 1976
created c.vnicism and disenchantment This once apain provided the excuse for vet another
military intervention led by Brigadier Muilala Mohammed on July 29 1975. The new
administration, which continued under General Obasanjo, after the untimely assassination
of Murtala, succeeded in restoring hope and confidence to the people, eventually
transferring power peacefully to a civilian regime under the presidency of Alhaji Shehu
Shagari on 1st October 1979
The Second Republic was not ushered in with as much enthusiasm and euphoria as the
first one nineteen years earlier. The chequered political history of the country had taught
the people not to expect the miraculous from the politicians. Nevertheless, thirteen years
of military rule and lack of popular participation in government, as well as the fact that the
miliiary had not proved to be less immune to corruption and abuse of power, had
convinced the majority of the population that there is little alternative to a government
freely chosen by the people and equally responsible and accountable to them Hut the
unprecedented nolitical corruption and aross mismariaL'mem of the nation's economv thai
characterised the Second Republic provided the militarv the reasons tor their second
coming on 31st December 1983. The new military regime, was, however, shortlived. Its
high handedness and authoritarian approach to dealing with the nation's problems soon led
it into a head-on coalition with the press, human right activists and others who were
systematically harassed and incarcerated By the time the Head of State. Major General
Buhari, was overthrown by his own Chief of Army staff, Major General Ibrahim
Babaneida. on (he 27th of Aueust 1985. the level of Dublic disenchantment with
government hieh-handedness had risen so hieh as to nrovide a olausiblc. if not legitimate,
justification for (he new. militarv ruler who. in a auite symbolic, if significant, act adonted
the title of President
Bobangida and the Abortive Third Republic
Whatever its eventual debacle, the Babangida administration took its self-imposed task of
ruling ihe nation seriously. To its credit, it initiated and embarked on many programs and
projects to achieve its aims In an attempt to endear itself to the public and curry the
support of a wide spectrum of the nation's population, !he new government immediately
repealed the obnoxious Public Officers Protection Against False Accusation Decree No. 4
of 1984. Journalists and oilier human right activists being held under that decree and
Decree no. 2 were unconditionally released. Four days later eighty seven politicians and
many other politically incarcerated Nigerians were released from various detention
centers. In his first independent anniversary broadcast the President declared a fifteen
month state of economic emergencv to nut the hattered nation's economv back in shape
He also announced that the fundamental objectives of his administration would be
economic reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance. A ban was placed on the
importation of rice, and later wheat, to conserve dwindling foreign exchange and stimulate
local production.
A highlight of the major programs of the administration will be quite instructive in an
examination of its achievements. The economy was the first area to receive immediate
attention. As a result of a nationwide debate initiated bv the government, the neoole
overwhelminelv reiected the takinc of the orooosed IMF loan, and voted instead to make
the necessary sacrifices to put the economy back in shape. Consequently on December
12, the Government announced its decision not to take the IMF support loan in spite of
pressures from its international creditors and the World Bank to take the loan with all its
conditionalities. What is interesting, however, is the fact that the government went ahead
and beaan to implement systematically the various conditionalities attached to the IMF
loan without takirte the loan itself. In mid-December 1985. it removed 80 Dcrccnt of the
subsidv on oetroleum nroducts excent kerosene. It also Phased out the issuing of import
licenses, a practice that had (generated a lot of malpractices. However, unable to resist the
nroddirms of the IMF. the government, without anv public consultation, went ahead, and
look the IMF loan In Julv 1986. the Structural Adjustment ProaramfSAP). was
introduced. This was followed in September bv the second-Tier Foreign Exchange
MarketfSFHMV This was to have the most far reachine consequences since it btxan the
uradual devaluation of the Niaerian currencv. (he Naira. a devaluation the IMF had bean
reauestiniJ tor lone in order to allow the Nairn in tind ils level in a free market This, il
was believed, will discourage import while encouraging export Unfortunately, this did not
happen while the value of the Naira plummeted far beyond government control and far
below the initial IMF expectations. From an exchange rate of $1 to #2 in 1986, a dollar
was been sold in the parallel market in late 1993 for #50. Since 1989, inflation rate had
remained at a very hyper-level with prices tripling every year. By 1993, the country's
external debt stood at about $35 billion. Life bacame hard and harsh for the majority of the
Dooulation The ensnine discontentment resulted in brain drain to the cirivale sector and to
other countries. Strikes, industrial unrest, eratt and corruption became a permanent
feature of Ihe lime as Deoole became desnerate to make ends meet and to survive Other
problems were also tackled A new population census was succesRillv carried out and in
March 1992. the President announced a new nomilation rieure of 88.5 million for the
country. In Aueust 1991. nine new states as well as 47 new local Government areas were
created to satisfy local demands for autonomy and brine covemment and develODment
nearer to the oeoole. In December 1991. the seat of the Federal Government was moved
from Lasos to Abuia markinc the formal man miration of Abuia as the new Federal
Capital.
Transition Crisis
When Babangida came to power in August 1985, he knew that 15 years of military rule
had not reconciled Nigerians to the idea of permanent military rule. Experience had also
shown that one of the easiest way for a military regime to gain public support is to make
some commitment to transition to civil rule. Early in the life of the regime the government
announced its commitment to the defense of human rights and to democracy In January
1986, the ban placed on the National Union of University Students and the Nigerian
Medical Association by the last military regime was lifted. That same month the Political
Bureau was inaugurated. Its mandate was to carrv out a nation wide debate and make
recommendations on the Doliticat future of the countrv. Fifteen months later, the Bureau
submitted its report. Amorm other thines. it recommended the adootion of the American
Dresidcntial svstem . the creation of more states, the initiation of programs to inculcate
democratic and Datriotic norms in the nooulace. As a follow-UD to the Bureau's rcoort. in
Julv 1987 the Directorate of Mass Mobilization for Social Justice, Self-Reliance and
Economic RecoveryfMAMSER) was launched to educate, mobilize and prepare the
electorate for the new dispensation. In March 1938, in addition to the National Population
Commission, the National Revenue Mobilization Commission, the Code of Conduct
Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal were established In May 1988, the Constituent
Assembly was inaugurated A year later a new constitution was passed into law The
National Electoral Commission was established and the ban on politics was lifted A
multiplicity of parties came into beine. In October 1989, NKC recommended the
recognition of six. The aovernment. however, rejected NEC's recommendations and
banned all the Dailies. It claimed thai none of the Darties was able to meet the
reouirements that tliev must not be regionally or ethnicallv based but should reflect lite
federal character of the countrv and should be solvent cnoueli as not to be hiiacked bv am
"monev ban". Instead, the uovernment announced it was establishing two Darties both of
which would be financed bv the Government who would also define their ideolouical
Dositions with one being a little to the riaht and the other beintt a little to the left. The two
Darties were Hie National Renublican Convention and the Social Democratic Partv
respectively. Politicians were directed to find their company in any of the two parties.
The date for the transfer of power to civilians was shifted from October 1990 to January
1993. In sphe of mounting skepticism on the part of the intelligentsia and some
politicians, the transition program took off well. Local government elections were held
successfully throughout the country. In January 1992, elected civilian governors and
members of the state assemblies were sworn in in all the thirty states of the federation
The National Assemhlv elections were successfully held in Julv 1992 The elected
members were, however, not to be swom in until earlv 1993 lareelv because the
Government could no) tirare nut on time what nower it was nrenared ro surrender to
them and which to retain
The presidential election was however, to cause the most uneasiness Twice in mid-1992
the presidential nrimaries were susnended When evenluallv the Government nermitled lit
to hold in Ocrober 1992. the President canceled the results of the orimaries. alleeine
wtdefwead corruption and she use of money to buy votes Tbe cancellation was received
with widespread cynicism as leaders of opinions all over the nation came out lo criticize
the government accusing it or having a hidden agenda. As rumors filter around that the
government intends to extend the transition to 1995, eminent Nigerians, like General
Obasanjo and others warned the administration that it will be insulting the nation's
intelligence and courting disaster to extend its stay in office beyond 1993 In this
atmosphere of apprehension the government announced that it was postponing civilian
rule till 27 August 1993, the date of its eight year anniversary in office.
Amidst doubts and apprehension over the commitments of the administration to handing
over, new primaries were held culminating in the Presidential election on June 12 1993.
As the results of the election began to come in and it became evident that MKO Abiola,
the candidate of the Social Democratic Party, was out to win by a wide margin, the
government stepped in. It stopped the announcement of the results, eventually annulling
the whole election and suspending in its entirety the whole transition program on June 23
The uproar and the sustained massive protest that greeted the cancellation took the
government by surprise. It had under-estimated the strength of the people's opposition
and the level of government's unpopularity. Unable to suppress the riot and squelch the
mounting protest, Babangkta was harried and hurried out of office in disgrace barely two
months after the cancellation of the election result. An interim government dominated by
members of the Babangida's administration took over. It, however, could not last as
opposition continued. The helplessness and indeed powerlessness of the government to
force its acceptance on the people only exacerbated the crisis. Eventually, in the midst of
continued protest and lawlessness which followed the ill-timed and ill-advised removal of
the subsidies on uetroleum oroducl. the uulilaiv once auain took over nower in November
1993.
Reasons for the Election Crisis
Many reasons have been adduced to explain the 1993 election crisis. It has been argued
that the crisis resulted from the refusal of the North to concede or allow political power to
be transferred to the south. Those who took this position maintained that since Nigeria's
independence all democratic elections had been won by parties based in the North and
with northern presidential candidates In addition, apart from the first military ruler, who
was ultimately assassinated in a coup engineered by northern army officers, all coup
planners had conceded the fact that a northerner must always be the Head of state. The
only exception was Obasanjo who succeeded by "accident" following the untimely
assassination of Murtala. To pacify the North, Musa Yaradua, a northern army officer,
was given accelerated promotion and made the next in command. The fact that the
resistance to Babangida's attempt to perpetuate himself in power and the refusal to accept
the cancellation of the June 12 election was most pronounced in the West, among the
Yoruba and in the home base of Abiola who won the annulled election, seems to lend
some weight to this inter-regional competition perspective. No doubt, it would be
intellectually dishonest not to recognize the influence of ethno-regional fears and suspicion
in the unfolding of the political crisis in Nigeria. Available evidence shows that the
northern ruling elite, because of the educational lag of the North, had always been
apprehensive of losing the only thing it believes it has and needs, political power, to the
South. It feared what the South would do with that power, not least of which may be
tampering with the socio-political system and the relatively more conservative cultural
tradition of the Islamic emirates in the North. It is entirely not baseless to speculate that if
the North had stood behind the June 12 election and had not provided Babangida with the
breathing space and support he got, most likely the election result would have been upheld
and the perpetuation of military rule could have been forestalled Nevertheless, "tribalism"
or the old north-south rivalry would not alone explain the Nigerian crisis
What we are confronted with here is not the problem of people who can not live together
because they speak different languages. If heterogeneity would be an obstacle to unity, the
North is the least homogenous of the "three" Nigeria. It has more ethnic groups and speak
more languages than all the other regions combined. And in any case it is indeed difficult
to keep speaking about "regions" in comtemporary Nigeria with the break-up into thirty
states. It is indeed interesting that in spite of the existence of many states people sill
continue to speak in terms of regions and whatever the pundits might argue, the idea of
North, South, East and West is not yet dead However, if there is any lesson from the
1993 election it is to the effect that the problem of ethnicity and regionalism are fast
becoming secondary, what ever their prior significance. Abiola, the candidate of the SDP,
in spite of the fact that he was from the "South", won the election in ten of the 14 states in
the south and won nine out of the sixteen states in the north including Kaduna, and Kami,
the most populous state in the North and the home state of his NRC challenger, Bashir
Tofa. That ethnicity or regionalism reared up their ugly heads again is largely the handy
work of the ruling ruling classes and their conscious and deliberate manipulation of ethno-
regional forces to pursue their political ends and entrench themselves in power.
Another explanation given has been religion. It has been argued that the religious
differences between the pre-dotninantly Christian South and the pre-dominantly Muslim
North had made national unity a problem. This is also begging the issue. Neither the South
nor the North is uniformly Christian or Muslim. It is often forgotten that the two religious
groups had lived together in harmony until 1985 when the Babangida's administration,
under pressure from the northern religious and political elite surreptitiously enrolled
Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Prior to this time religion
was not a divisive force in national politics. However, the uproar and the resistance that
followed this government politicization of religion created such bitterness and suspicion
and fear of forced islamization that for the first time religion became a destabilizing force
in the nation's politics. The periodic and violent outbursts of religious riots and clashes,
which became pronounced especially in the North From 1985, should be seen as by-
products of the administration's politicization of religion. Nevertheless while religious
tension continued, by the time of the election in 1993, a lot of progress had been made in
restoring mutual trust. The fact that both the presidential candidates of the SDP were
Muslims did not stop them from sweeping off the votes in the pre-dominantly Christian
South and much of the Christian parts of the North. Like the issue of ethnicity, whatever
the religious differences existing in the country, the 1993 election showed very clearly that
religious differences need not be a divisive factor in national politics That it had been so in
the last eight years was a consequence of its conscious and often reckless manipulation for
narrow interests by the administration and its allies and other beneficiaries.
In all these examination of the importance and exploitation of centrifugal forces, the
intentions and activities of the government appear to have loomed very large. This has led
many to blame Babangida and him alone for the 1993 crisis. Those who took this position
argued that by its action and inaction the Babangida administration had given skeptics
sufficient reasons to doubt its intentions. The way the administration decreed two political
parties into existence and constantly monitored, controlled and dictated their agenda and
activities had drawn sharp criticisms. Over the years the government banned and unbanned
politicians with a baffling inconsistencies that had left most people guessing its real
intentions. This, the critics argued, is not the way to nurture and develop a democratic
tradition. "The only program in town," Obasanjo declared in April 1993, "is Babangtda's
program as he plays it, as he unfolds it and as he enunciates it. He is the program, and he
is the government, he is what goes and what does not go."< Tell, July S, 1993) Many spoke
repeatedly of Babangida's double agenda: one which is open was to keep the nation
endlessly talking politics and holding abortive elections while the hidden but real agenda
was to abort the transition program and prolong Babangida's stay in power. The
continuous tampering with the transition program and the repeated postponement of the
handing aver date as well as the nefarious activities of such anti-transition and pro-
Babangida's associations like the Association for Better Nigeria(ABN), the Third Eyes
and others were all perceived as part of an elaborate and clansdestine plan to abort the
transition program While there is a lot of truth in the statement made by Obasanjo at the
conference organized by the Arewa House on the state of the nation in February 1994 that
"GEN. BABANGIDA IS THE ARCHITECT OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE
NATION FINDS ITSELF TODAY" (The Guardian, February 4, 1994; emphasis in the
original) Babangida alone will not explain the Nigerian crisis. He may have been the most
resilient and most dexterous player, he was certainly not the only actor. He succeeded
because there were individuals and groups who for various reasons were willing to
cooperate with him in order to pursue their different interests. For as one of the past Head
of states lamented. "We are where we are today because responsible, mature, respected
voices and those normally looked up to in the society and the community, either for
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economic reasons or fear, abdicated their responsibility, wringing their hands in fruitless
and hopeless exhortation."(The ihiardiai, February 4,1994).
The 1993 crisis was not an ethno-regional or religious conflict. It was a continuation of
the power struggle between the various classes and groups of the ruling and dominant
elite. That it assumed, as it developed, regional and ethnic dimensions was a fallout of the
conscious manipulation of these differences, real or artificial but not inherently divisive, by
the various parties involved. Babangida's success, not only in keeping himself in power
for so long but also in frustrating the democratic transition he has initiated, was a function
partly of his singular dexterity as a political player and the availability of willing and
unscrupulous collaborators among the dominant elite whether military or civilian. His
achievement is in accurately diagnosing the ills and the weaknesses of (he nation, but
instead of working to heal those weaknesses, he deliberately set out to exacerbate and
exploit them for his own ends.
Transition, Popular culture and ike Re-Awakening of Civil Society
In its attempt to win public support, the Babangida administration went to great length to
extend its influence over a wide spectrum of the various interest groups in the country.
To ensure the loyalty of the army, the real basis of its legitimacy and power, steps were
taken to eliminate possible sources of disenchantment. Many serving and retired army
officers were given shares in government and other forms of inducement. Another group
that came under increased government influence were the traditional rulers. In spite of
modernization and the introduction of western forms of government especially at the local
government level, traditional rulers have continued to exercise major influence in national
affairs. Recognizing the continuing resilience of these traditional institutions, the
government over the years had tried to enlist their support in the pursuit of its programs.
Traditional rulers were regularly and routinely courted. They were used as "fire fighters"
in times of serious domestic and national crises. In July 1993, for instance, a panel headed
by the Sultan of Sokoto was largely instrumental in defusing the year-long protracted
crisis between University teachers and the Federal Government. Babangida himself
received many notable traditional titles from different parts of the nation. The attempts of
the administration to exploit the influence of traditional rulers sometimes resulted in
troubles for the various parties involved. It is widely believed that the government's
decision to secretly enlist Nigeria as a full member of the Organization of Islamic
Conference was at the instance of the Sultan of Sokoto, the most prominent traditional
ruler in the country. Similarly, after the cancellation of the June 12 election, the
administration also tried to use the traditional rulers to appeal to the people and gain time
for the administration. The key traditional rulers were invited to Abuja, where the
government attempted to win their support. After the meeting, Oba Okunade Sijuade, the
Ooni of Ife and the most influential Yoruba ruler, was chosen as the spokesman for the
royal fathers. His "double talk" to the press after the meeting, which appeared to endorse
Babangida's annulment of the election, created problems for the monarch among his own
people. He was denounced for allowing himself to be used as a stooge by the
administration.("How Not To Talk," Tempo, 26 July, 1993) In the same vein, the Sultan
of Sokoto was accused of complicity in the cancellation of the result of the election. His
failure to condemn Babangida's action until it was too late, was used by his critics as a
clear indication of his complicity. Similarly, the administration also sought the support of
religious leaders, from both sides of the pole, through donations of large sums of money
for the building of mosques and churches and the granting of other favours.
Pro-Democracy Organizations and the Struggle for Democracy
The civil society was also affected in various ways by the struggle for democracy during
the Babangida's years. As the regime became more authoritarian and more intolerant of
opposition, its intentions to hold on to power indefinitely became more evident. The ability
of the administration to silence its critics and financially "settle" its adversaries, was
causing a lot of concern for all advocates of liberty and democracy in the country.
Consequently, concerned individuals and groups began to band together to form new
associations committed to defending human rights and democracy. As early as 1981, the
Committee of Concerned Citizens had been set up to monitor and consider issues
connected with the development of democratic tradition in.the country. But not much
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could be achieved as military rule returned in 1983 Bui as Babangida's strangulation of
critical opinions intensified and as his administration repeatedly reneged on its promise to
re-establish democracy the need to awake the Nigerian civil society to its responsibilities
and its strength led to the formation of new organizations. In October 1987 two young
lawyers, Olisa Agbakoba and Clement Nwanko established the Civil Liberty
Organization(CLO). Its objective was to monitor and advance the cause of human rights
in the country. Its immediate attention was directed towards exposing to public and
international attention the inhuman conditions prevailing in many Nigerian prisons. By
providing legal assistance and by active collaboration with the press it succeeded in
securing the release of many prisoners and other detainees who were being held illegally or
without trial, (t soon became popular, establishing branches in different parts of the
nation. It became the ombudsman for individuals with an- ax to grind with the
administration. It began to prepare and to publish for general circulation, an annual report
on the human right situation in the country. It documented and publicized many cases of
government abuse of human rights. One of such cases was the arrest and imprisonment
without charge of Gani Fawehinmi in a remote prison in the north for four months.
Fawehinmi had sought to prosecute two high-ranking slate security officials for the
murder of the Newswatch editor, Dele Giwa.
Before long, it became apparent that the military can no longer be trusted to voluntarily
return the country to democracy. Besides, other legitimate means of opposition like the
judiciary, the legislature, and the labor unions have either been silenced, weakened,
intimidated to submission or "settled." The constant doctoring of the transition program
also bellied government's commitment to democracy. It became clear, that democracy
would have to be fought for, through a vigorous and systematic mobilization of the
population Thus, as the threats to democracy increased, new associations were established
to push forward the struggle for freedom from corruption and authoritarian rule In
February 1990, Nwanko and others formed the Constitutional Rights Projects(CRP) But
the group that was to have the most profound influence during the 1993 crisis was the
Campaign for Demoeracy(CD). This was established by Gani Fawehinmi, the militant
human-right lawyer, Beko Ransom-Kuti, the crusading one time leader of Nigerian
Medical Association, Olu Onagoruwa, the constitutional lawyer, as well as Chris Ubani
and others. One other group that emerged during the 1993 crisis was the Movement for
National Reformation established by Anthony Enahoro, a former federal minister Another
was the high profile Association for Democracy, Good Governance in Nigeria(ADGGN)
established by Genera] Obasanjo and made up of former heads of states and other
prominent citizens. The caliber of its membership, as well as Obasanjo courageous and
uncompromising leadership, made the association a thom in the flesh of the administration.
More importantly, however, the CD and the CLO became the rallying point of popular
opposition to Babangida's attempt to subvert the democratic transition. Through press
releases, pamphlets, handbills and public rallies and demonstrations they provoked,
organized and sustained popular opposition to the Babangida's regime till the very end.
The arrest and detention of their leaders did not in any way diminish their effectiveness.
So influential and so effective were these human right groups that they succeeded in
literally paralyzing life and activities in the south-western parts of the country and in
virtually bringing the nation to a halt. They routinely exposed the selfishness and
inordinate ambition of the military and their collaborating-politicians to public ridicule.
They succeeded in mobilizing the public to actively and vigorously reject the
"treacherous" attempts of the political class to take the nation for a ride and fool the
public. That the campaign to remove Babnngida was sustained and ultimately succeeded,
even after the political class had virtually capitulated, was principally due to the resilience
and courage of these groups and their allies in the media.
Being present during the 1993 crisis in Nigeria, it is indeed tempting to exaggerate the
achievements of the pro-democracy groups. By the lime the crisis was temporarily defused
with the forced exit of Babangida, the pro-democracy group had become a force to reckon
with in the game of power politics in the country. It is indeed instructive to note that
when, in November 1993, senior army officers came together to plan the return of
temporary military rule, as a way out of the deepening political crisis, the issue that
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bordered them most was not the likely resistance of the politicians. They knew how to
take care of that group. What disturbed them most, according to one of the planners,
Major General David Mark, was how to handle the popularity and effectiveness of the
pro-democracy groups. As he puts it, "the CD and CLO had gained so much popularity
that it would be difficult for the military (o rule without bloodshed." (Newswatch, April
11,1994) But 1993 had shown the limit and indeed the futility and danger of coercion in
the face of an awakened, politically sensitized and determined citizenship. Babangida's
failure and his disgrace from office was widely seen as an indictment of the military, but
the politician did not fare better either. Their willingness to compromise and be "settled"
gave them a negative image before the public. The only group with considerable respect
and credibility were the pro-democracy groups whose leaders were widely regarded as
heroes and champions of the people. Even the military oligarchy recognize that to ignore
the "power" of the pro-democracy groups is for it to do so at its own peril. The return of
the military to power should not belittle the significance of the pro-democracy
achievements of 1993.
Thus, the contribution of the pro-democracy groups to the struggle for democracy in
Nigeria should not be under-estimated. Beyond their immediate achievements, their more
fundamental significance as catalyst of democracy and as facilitators in the resurgence of
civil society must be recognized. As independent and autonomous groups free from
official control and funding, they provided the basis for the re-awakening of civil society in
the face of authoritarianism. Through their activities and especially their outspoken
assertiveness they helped to sustain democratic ideas and values. Through their resistance
to dictatorship and oppression in all their ramifications they helped to prepare the way for
the emergence of an articulate, vibrant and pluralistic civil society, without which a
democratic tradition can not develop By organizing and encouraging the active
participation of the majority of the population in politics they rescued politics from being
the exclusive preserve of a tiny minority. They made the people to become actively
involved in the determination of their future and the destiny of their nation. By taking
politics to the grassroots level, politics was demystified. By awakening the citizenry to
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their rights and obligations in the making of a democratic society the people were given a
stake in the construction of a new and equitable social order By relentlessly and
effectively exposing and criticizing corruption and the misuse of power, they reintroduced
moral and ethical considerations into the arena of politics and public policy. By
democratizing the democratic transition they seized the initiatives from the politicians and
transferred the decision-making process to the public realm. Polticians were kept on their
Iocs and forced to take cognizance of the true interests of their people. By sensitizing and
conscientizing the populace, and stimulating political participation in the general public,
they set the stage for the evolution of an articulate, responsible and democratic citizenship.
Their remarkable success can be explained by the level of commitment and the dedication
of the leadership, their effective organization and their ability to accurately articulate and
express the grievances and the yearnings of the populace. Equally important is the
credibility and the moral integrity of the leaders, their ability to insulate themselves from
politics, rise above ethno-sectarian antipathy while powerfully projecting an image of a
leadership and a group uncompromisingly committed to justice, equality, patriotism,
human rights and democracy. In a nation, where visionary and incorruptible leadership
had become a scarce commodity, the emergence of the pro-democracy groups was a
welcome respite.
The Media and the Transition Crisis
One of the institutions significantly affected by the whole transition crisis was the press.
The Babangida era, with all its active politicization of every aspect of the people's life
from money to education to religion, was a time of rapid expansion for the press most
especially the private press. Between 1985 and 1993 the number of private newspapers
and weekly magazines doubled. From the inception of the administration, Babangida
portrayed himself as a military democrat Recognizing the influence of the press in
affecting public opinion and establishing legitimacy for any government, the administration
took steps to win the support of the press. It repealed the anti-press Decree number 4 of
the last military regime. Incarcerated editors and critics were released from detention. To
seal the halcyon relationship with the press, Babangida appointed Duro Onabule, one of
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the most outspoken journalist who was also the editor of one of the mosi critical private
newspapers, National Concord, as his Press Secretary. Journalists were routinely invited
to the state house and regularly feted and courted. Some of the leading journalists became
unofficial consultants to the government as their views were sought with regard to issues
of national and domestic interests. The Nigerian free press had never had it so good It is
not surprising that many of the newspapers and magazines and iheir journalists became
willing and enthusiastic supporters of the administration. The appointment of notable and
highly respected human right advocates like Professor Olikoye Ransome-Kuti, a member
of the celebrated Funmilayo Ruti family, as the minister of Health, and of Bola Ajibola, the
controversial and outspoken critic of the last administration and President of the Nigerian
Bar Association, as Minister of Justice and Attorney General, gave the administration a
populist image and seem to lend practical proof to its avowed commitment to the
protection of human rights and to democracy This image was later reinforced by the
appointments of Dr. Tai Solarin, a noted social critic as the chairman of the common
People's Bank and of Professor Wole Soyinka, the Nobel laureate and playwright as the
chief of the newly established Federal Road Safety Corps(FRSC).
The honeymoon, however, did not last for too long. As the administration tightened its
hold on power and as the true character and intentions of the President became clearer, it
became increasingly evident that the self-proclaimed military democrat had little
commitment to honoring his pledge to hand over to an elected government. One by one
the private newspapers began to extricate themselves from the favors and overtures of the
administration. Before long they became rather vocal in their criticisms of the growing
official corruption and the reckless mismanagement of the nation's resources. As Ihe
criticism became more vociferous and embarrassing and the press became more militant,
the government initial favorable- overtures to the press turned to hostility. The press
became an enemy to be hunted down By 1986, the innovative and trail-blazing news
magazine, Newswatch, led the way in this unsparing assault on the administration. After
several weeks of arrests and interrogation, by the National Security OrganizationfNSO),
the founding editor-in-chief of Newswatch and evidently the most popular journalist of the
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time. Dele Giwa, was killed by a Setter bomb widely believed to have been sent to his
home by the government secret service unit. The public support and sympathy for the
harassed press and the open implication of the administration in the murder only
succeeded in further emboldening the press in its self avowed mission of being the
people's watch dog and mouth piece. The government, however, remained unrelenting in
its determination to brook little opposition. In the last few years of the administration,
virtually all the private newspapers and magazines were repeatedly and routinely shut
down and re-opened by the military. Journalists who refused to be intimidated,
blackmailed or "settled" were regularly arrested and incarcerated.
This state of uneasiness reached its climax during the 1993 election crisis. With all other
avenues of protest and resistance effectively muted and muzzled, with leaders of opinion
"developing tight lips and withered hands"(Obasanjo: Tell, June 7, 1993), the Press took
on the responsibility of articulating and given expression to the will of the people. In
sensational and often provocative editorials and headlines, the Press, time and again, took
the government to task, casting doubts on the transition program and raising awkward
questions on government intentions. It popularized and sensationalized evidence that
bellies official pronouncements and reveals the hidden agenda of the administration. The
cancellation of the June 12 election result became the final straw that shattered whatever
moderation the press had exercised in its relation with the government. The cancellation
and the suspension of the entire transition program confirmed the worst fears of the press.
It came down heavily and unsparingly on the administration. Stigmatizing Babangida as
being principally and singularly responsible for the unfolding crisis and imminent civil war,
it directed all its venomous criticism at his person, using terms and phrases that would
make press watchers even in relatively freer societies like the United States to shudder. A
sample of such headlines is quite revealing of the new face of the Nigerian media. Some
of such headlines are "A Dictator Cornered" "Unpopular at Home, Spurned Abroad, Can
Babangida Survive?"(Tempo, 26 July, 1993), "On the Brink of Catastrophe", "Showdown
Imminent"(7>fflrpo, 9 August, 1993), "Go Now, Soyinka Tells mB "(Daily Sketch), "Let's
Revolt Now-Bala Usman,"(7i?//). "Stolen Presidency: IBB Wages War On The
Nation'(Tell, 27 July 1993), "Coup Against Nigeria: How Babaneida Fooled The
Nation"(4frica« Concord July S, 1993). These and similar headlines not only alarmed the
government but gave the impression of a nation in serious crisis. Indeed for the press, as
for the reading public whose interests it believed it was serving, the nation was already at
war, though mercifully not yet a shooting war.
The Government, on iis part, responded in kind. It directed alt federal government owned
media like the Daily Times, the New Nigerian, the National Television Authority and other
few pro-Babangida media to launch a counter offensive against all opponents of the
government. In sponsored advertisements and publications in newspapers and in the
electronic media, most of which it controlled, the administration contested with the
opposition press for the support of the people. This, however, could not help the
government, as its popularity declined. The pro-government press suffered a drastic loss in
readership as the opposition press were having a free day. Soon it became clear to all the
parties involved that the contest for public support would have to be fought and won in
the media. Unable to beat the media houses at their own game, the government took
stronger measures. Two weekly magazines-7i// and The News- the most consistent and
obviously the most popular critics of the administration were the first (o fall under the
government sledge hammer. Intensified harassment led to the seizure of well over 300,000
copies of the magazines from their printers. To elude government agents, the magazines
changed their format to tabloid that could easily be printed in black and white in any of the
numerous presses without detection and seizure. Eventually the two newspaper were
proscribed and their editors declared wanted for treasonable felony. In response The News
editors went underground, re-emerging with a new tabloid, Tempo. Tempo was an instant
success. It became the most popular and most widely-read tabloid in the country. All
attempts made by the regime to find where the illegal newspaper was being printed or to
track down its elusive and "ghost" editors proved abortive. Exeperated, the government
in desperation sent out soldiers to patrol the streets, seize the subversive papers from
vendors all over the country and arrest any one caught reading the offensive publications.
As international opposition to the government mounted and various sanctions began to be
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imposed by western nations, the Secretary of Information had to call a world conference
to announce that the administration had sufficient evidence lo prove that Tempo was being
printed inside the American Embassy.
As the nation was being rocked by unabating demonstrations and brutal repression,
especially in the south-western pan of the country, the government came under a chorus
of criticisms. Prominent citizens, including former heads of states, called on the
government to reverse its decision, accept the verdict of the June 12 election and
disengage the army totally from politics. Feeling boxed into a comer and infuriated at the
unrelenting press atlacks the government took more desperate measures. On the 22 July,
in an unprecedented move and in one fell swoop it shut down five newspapers and one
radio station. The most hard-hit was the Concord group, comprising about seven
publications and owned by Abiola, the winner of the June 12 election. The others were
the Punch, the Abuja Newsdqy, and the Sketch, owned jointly by the governments of Oyo,
Ogun, Ondo and Osun states, whose governors had left no one in doubt about their
support for Abiola and their opposition to Babangida. The Reporter, shut down the
previous year remained shut. Much pressure led to the opening of the Ogun State
Broadcasting Corporation but its place was taken up by the Observer newspaper, owned
by the Edo State governments. A few days later new decrees prescribing draconian
punishments for erring newspapers and journalists formally legalized government actions,
as heavily armed soldiers settled down with their mattresses, for a round the clock siege,
to enforce the closure order.
With the leading opposition media under lock and key, the Secretary of Information,
Comrade Uche Chukwumerije, threatened brimstone and fire on the head of all the
enemies of the administration. In a letter to the President, the Secretary, who incidentally
was the Secretary of Propaganda for the defunct Biafra, warned that "The danger facing
Nigeria today is reminiscent of the pre-war situation of 1965-66, and the outcome will be
as decisive ...We must mobilize immediately." He spoke of the need lo "contesi the
control of the print media and reinforce our superiority in the electronic media." As an
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immediate step to seizing back the initiative and regaining the control or public opinion
which had been ruthlessly exploited by the Ibadan-Lagos press axis whose stranglehold
must be broken, Chukwumerije asked the government for 0260 million to mount a
publicity and propaganda counter-offensive at home and abroad.
Cartoons, Folklore mid Politics
The successful clampdown on, and the military siege of the critical media, however, did
not mean the end of opposition to the administration. The remaining newspapers on the
two sides of the struggle and those who claimed to be neutral continued in various ways to
express (heir views of the administration. The use of the cartoons became an effective
means of expressing opinions about the administration. Day after day, the public was
bombarded with different kinds of cartoons implicitly cynical and covertly critical of the
government. These cartoons look on a life of their own. Unlike before the election, they
were no longer generally limited to the media. They began to appear in locally produced
books, pamphlets and in handbills and leaflets. These leaflets became popular and were
widely photocopied and circulated freely among the population. Many of them were
produced in or translated into many of the indigenous languages. Produced anonymously
or under false or pen names they became means of laughter in the midst of tension. They
also served to reinforce and meet the people's need for means of voicing their opposition
to the administration without running foul of the law. In their expression they are usually
very graphic, vivid, fanny, playful and imaginative. The political crisis became a catalyst
for innovative arts. The protagonists in the conflict, and most especially the president,
were given various connotations. Babangida got many new names, titles and aliases. He
became Maradona per excellence, the sly and wily footballer who after using his hand to
net in a goal during one of the world cup tournaments denied any complicity and swore
that if any hand was involved it must have been the finger of God. Babangida constant
swearing on the koran and in the name of Allah to convince his listener that he was telling
the truth, while repeatedly breaking his promises, became subjects of fascinating cartoons.
As the master player and strategist he was depicted as the trickish player who after scoring
many sensational "own goals" fell over his own bootstraps and finally boxed himself into a
corner. One cartoon, titled "stolen presidency", showed him being literally crushed under
the heavy load of the presidency on his back as he struggles to escape from the country
balancing his heavy burden with one hand and clutching a sub-machine gun dripping with
bullets with the other. Another depicted him as an army general groping in darkness and
heedlessly leading his soldiers into the abysses. Some painted him as the well-fed Queen
Bee with a rotunda stomach constantly calling his impoverished and skinning people to be
ready to make more sacrifices, be patient and have faith in him since (here is hope at the
end of the tunnel. Others drew him with his back 10 the State House, trampling his feet on
the untried 1989 Constitution and carrying a placard reading-"presidency: no vacancy."
Local artists nude brisk business painting colorful, humorous, though far from
complementary pictures of the President, and sometimes of his "First Lady for Life" wife,
who according to some of the paintings could not imagine living a life outside the
presidency. It is also interesting to note many of these artworks, especially the one
produced outside the media houses, were not carried out by professional artists but by
local or popular artists who were responding in their own way to the unfolding crisis
around them, thereby helping to articulate public attitude and shape public opinion. While
some of them no doubt exploited the opportunity to make money and practice their art,
they had no doubt that they were engaged in a major socio-political discourse of national
significance. But it was not only the President who became a victim of the new
aggressiveness of popular art at this period. There were also many cartoons ridiculing and
castigating the politicians for their cowardice, their sycophancy, their hypocrisy, (heir
proverbial susceptibility to manipulation and corruption as well as their betrayal of the
people. A fuller study of the efflorescence and style of the cartoon as a genre of popular
art and its relationship to politics during this period will be quite instructive.
As these developments were taking place in the use of the visual art as an instrument of
political discourse, similar development began to be witnessed in other areas as well. New
proverbs emerged castigating the president and his loyalists. Old proverbs took on new
meaning and significance as they were adopted and adapted to make sense of the
constantly changing political situation. The art of story-telling also experienced a new
lease of life. Old and nearly forgotten folklores were resuscitated as people fell on
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traditional resources to deal with the crippling political crisis and give expression to their
feelings. Virtually every action of the government was recast into new stories or fitted into
old folktales. The fact that all electronic media in the country were controlled either by the
federal or state government and the fact that the federal government can and actually
threatened to close down any media hostile to it made caution the rule of the game The
closure of the Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation by (he order of the federal
government indicates how far the regime was prepared to go to muzzle hostile press.
Opposition however continued especially in the radio and television networks controlled
by states critical of the administration. While avoiding direct reference to the president or
his actions the opposition media took to the use of innuendoes, proverbs, parables, riddles
and jokes and drama sketches that were anything but innocent and neutral in their vivid
and covert expression of political opinions. Listeners were woken up and sent to bed with
interesting and satirical stories of the sly and cunning tortoise or the scheming and
stubborn spider whose actions and inactions were bringing damnation on themselves and
on their children. Only few people had any doubt who the real tortoise or spider was.
Many of these stories can be collected and analyzed for their imagery, metaphor, their
artistic and aesthetic qualities as well as their imaginativeness and their political
suasiveness.
To give an example, after the federal government announced that the vice-president
August Aikhomu was heading a panel to find a way out of the political quadrangle, the
Ondo State Radio, broadcasting from Akure, responded with an allegorical story which it
relayed in Yoruba several times a day and everyday until the committee completed its
assignment. Once upon a time, the story began, there was a town named "Senseless."
This town was in very deep trouble. To find a solution to the crisis, a committee was set
up by the "brainless" elders of "Senseless." The committee was however headed by a
man named "Gongosu"(a fool or a buffoon-subversive opinions have for years regarded
Aikhomu as a "munmun" or stooge for working under a man like Babangida!). The story
went further to state that a man named "Apaniyan"(murderer) was made the deputy
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chairman of the panel. This last reference is to Brigadier Haiilu Akilu who was the next
most senior army officer in the panel. Akilu, who heads the administration's intelligence
and secret service unit, has for years been implicated in the letter-bomb murder of the
popular Newswatch editor. Dele Giwa. The term "senseless" by which the town is named
can be taken to refer to the country . It may be a way of the storyteller passing his censor
on the "insanity" that had for years characterized the nation's political history. On the
other hand, the term may actually be referring to a specific lown-Abuja-the seat of the
Babangida's administration and the venue of all the political deals and settlements that had
thrown the nation into its current dilemma. The term "brainless" obviously refers to the
army. This is a parody of a general public stereotype attitude in the country which presents
military boys as being "all brawn and no brain" and whose claim to power was based on
the barrel of the gun rather than intellectual training. The narrator ended his story with a
question and a comment. It asked the listener what else any one should expect apart from
confusion in a town ruled by "brainless" people. He then wondered out aloud what kind of
recommendation or solution a committee constituted of such men can offer the people. As
the political drama unfolds the stories also changed as new elements were added and new
stories were formulated to take cognizance of new developments. Besides the stories,
there were also rumors, often highly tantalizing giving meaning and expression to the
prevailing political situation in the country.
Politics and Pub-Music
Popular music was also affected by the various developments in formal politics. The
importance of pub music in molding public opinion and shaping people's perception of
government action was recognized by the Babangida's administration. Early in its tenure,
the regime took steps to court the support of popular musicians. Within a few months of
the inception of the administration it released the popular Afro-Beat musician, Fela
Anikulapo-ICuti, from detention. Since he came into public limelight in the late 1960s
Fela, had consistently clashed with the nation's political leaders because of his overtly
critical appraisals of the military and the politicians in his songs. His problem with the
political and capitalist class reached its climax during the reign of General Obasanjo. By
1977, his residence and headquarters in Lagos, which he christened Kalakuta Republic to
express his defiance of the administration, but which was popularly referred to as the
Shrine, had become one of the most frequented spot in Lagos. Thouuli constantly
harassed, he remained unrelenting in his musical assault on the nation's leaders. Finally in
1977, the Shrine was invaded by heavily armed soldiers who ransacked the whole
compound before setting it on fire. The soldiers waved off fire-fighters and stood guide to
ensure that the "notorious" building is burnt down completely. Neither this nor the death
of his equally fiery and controversial mother, which came shortly after the raid, succeed in
deterring him. He came out with more records castigating soldiers as "zombies" or robots.
Another popular hit described the Head of state as a murderer who, in alliance with multi-
nationals and their local collaborators and big businessmen such as Abiola, who. was
described as "thief ..thief', is held responsible for the declining state of the nation.
However, government relations with pub musicians was not always one of confrontation.
There were instances of meaningful interactions and collaborations. Some were paid by
the administration to compose songs and wax records to publicize and promote its public
mobilization programs such as War Against lndiscipline(WAI), Mass Mobilization for
Social Justice, Self-Reliance and Economic Recovery(MAMSER) and the Better Life for
Rural Women Program. Many pub music festivals and events were sponsored, bankrolled
and attended by the administration. Notable pub musicians were invited to attend, and at
times to perform at, important state functions. On one occassion, the Presidency donated
#10 million to the Recording Musician Association of Nigeria.
These collaborations notwithstanding, the government was not always in a position to
effectively control the nature and direction of pub music. This is a function of the fact that
there were too many individuals and groups involved. Besides new ones were forming by
the days. While the government may be in a position to influence, if not control, the
leading musicians, it was not always within its jurisdiction to monitor what the majority of
the other musicians were doing. Most musicians carried on their profession oblivious of
government actions and agenda. But there were others who used their music and records
to articulate and express popular opinions and attitude with regard to the state of the
nation. More often than not they gave the impression of speaking for the ordinary or the
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common people usually referred to at "tnlaku" or -mckunnii" in the songs, Mniiy of the
songs were echoes ofiamentation. and cries of ngonics on the sorry economic slate ifce
rtHtion had been puehed into. Others were songs ridiculing the ever pei-vasive and endemic
corruption and the growing phenomenon of "settling" political opponents by gifts of
money or bribe. While some of the songs w o e critical of the administration, ihey were
generally ignored by the government «K long us shey were not. pftiiicvlnrly and overtly
subversive in content and tone as well as in implications.
In the coursft of the 199.1 election crisis, popular music assumed a new significance. The
heavy clampdowri on tho popular press and the muzzling of critical opinion in the
electronic media made popular music a ready instrument for the expression of attitude and
views critical of the administration While ihe politicians raid the tnililaiy generals were
r.nmnhwi ill nfiPflfialinns nnH lirHW nn tin- fimirr and riririnu nftha nitinn mm rnnnr, nml
. t tuiui uemiii^ A^cbuiumy WUJI me jncvainiiy JXJJUICHI Lnsis OCgHM to appear. Wltmn a
short time the new recods. began tv floud the markets. As rile people became skeptical of
the few icmai])iri| press and the uli-otroniv media being representative of popular opinion,
they turned increasingly 10 llic tmw i Boards. The more critical and the more unsparing the
songs, the more the demand for llic lcuurds Many of the records became immediate best
sellers »ubsift[>iiftll.y uuiuhing iheii unfsis and their producer*. Hitherto unknown artists
with the must liarJ-hiuinjj; sungs on the administration achieved instantaneous fame The
songs »in! ilicii comcsil's, as weH as the anists and tUe govitrnmtfil became subjects of
popular diicussioa and debated 'i'lie sungs spread from the urban center to the rural ureas
m record vendors mad" biisk business on ilicrnaUs and in gas stations peddling itie songs
in records or on cassettes explaining the contwitt and encouraging their customers and
pasiers-by to buy. The songs could be heard everywhere, in bcrbcrs' shop, tailors'
apartments and under the butcher's. shed. Taxi drivers played the different new "political"
music to entertain and to inform lheir passengers and provide topics for discussion Tht
grow'mg popularity of sumu of llie sungs and their stridently militant tones could noi for
long In- ijstKMcil by llie JJOVUI ntneirt. 11 ordereJ the arrest of cine of the artisvs, Olanrcwftjn
Adepojvi, an ™i(chat«> cxponem whose neiyly released album on the anatomy of the siak-
of the nation was making the waves. His arrest and arraign meni in court on charges of
treason, subversion and incitement of the public, only made htm a hero, as the sale of his
record soared. While the electronic stations controlled or sympathetic to the
administration blocked out the new songs, those controlled by state governments hostile
to the administration took pleasure in playing them. Some of the songs were adopted as
"anthems" and "jingoes" on some of (he stations. Other attempts made by the government
to seize the records from the producers and hunt down cassette peddlers proved abortive
The political situation and tension in the country and the fact that most of the subversive
songs were being produced and disseminated in areas of the country hostile to the
administration made checking this expression of popular sentiments difficult.
What was interesting or unique about the new songs was not that they were political; that
was not new. Rather it was that their militancy and vehemence accurately reflect the highly
charged state of verbal warfare going on in the country. Further their sheer number was
also unique. Besides, unlike before, they were more overtly political, less restrained and
openly subversive of the administration. Some of the most popular of the songs actually
called for the break up of the country inlo its component parts. A few of the artists
challenged the president by name and dared him to come and arrest them. Even more
significant is the fact that more than at any other period of the nation's history, politics
was brought squarely into the center of popular music. They also achieved something else.
They, at least for a while,, shifted or rather expanded the arena of political discourse from
the world of the dominant ruling elite. By so doing they re-establish politics as a matter of
general and common concern, thus adding a corrective to the picture of Nigerian politics
as purely within the domain and prerogative of the dominant ruling elite. Like (he press
and the pro-democracy groups these outpouring of artistic expression all combined io
promote the efflorescence and sustenance of democratic aspirations and values in the face
of authoritarianism and at a particularly difficult period of the nation's political evolution.
Together, they demonstrated the versatility, adaptability and resilience of popular culture
in the midst of crisis.
27
Sources and References

















N. Azikiwe. Democracy with Military Vigilance. Nsukka, 1974.
O. Awolowo, The People's Republic. London, 1947
L. Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria. Syracuse University Press,
New York, 1988
-(ed\ The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the
Developing World. New York, 1992
B. I. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1973
T. t-'alolaandJ Ihonvbere. The Rise and Fall of Nigerian Second Republic. 1979-1983.
London, 1984
R. A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: 1 he Rise and Kail of the
Second Reouhlic. Cambridge, 1987
O. Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Hnugu, 1V78
Ci. O'Donell and P. C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, 1986
O, Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule. London, 1970
M. Peil, Nigerian Holitics: The People's View. London,
R. L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent Nation. Princeton, 1963
C. S. Whitaker, The Politics ot Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria.
1946-66. Princeion, 1970
t: Young, The Holitics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison, ICJ76
U
